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Abstract: We present a method for the temporal properties verification of
complex systems. Its interest lies in a coordinated use of both exhaustive analyze
and simulation techniques. The model is based on a unique formalism, called
TIOSM (Timed Input output State Machine) which is a specialization of Timed
Automata. The exhaustive analysis is done by model checking and concerns only
partial models that represent critical parts of the whole system. The results
obtained on these partial models are inserted in the global model that can be then
simulated. In the paper, we give rules for defining partial model, analyzing them
and integrating the results in the global model, that can therefore simulated.
Keywords: validation, timed automata, real-time, simulation, model-checking,
complexity.
1. INTRODUCTION
The level of abstraction or the accuracy of a model is
inverse ratio to its capacity to be treated in a bounded
time. Two ways can be used for a model analysis:
- by exhaustive exploration of the model,
- by simulation of the model.
This last approach allows getting results quickly but
the pertinence of these results is linked to the
scenario and the simulation duration. In the first
approach, results are deterministic but the
combinatory explosion is a bar to exhaustive method
application.
Nevertheless, exhaustive exploration of model can be
required for critical parts of systems while for the
other parts, validation can be done thanks to
simulation techniques.  For example, for speci-
fication of the METEOR subway control, exhaustive
analysis of formal models is used only for parts
involved in safety properties as doors closing and
opening, emergency stop, … (Bustany, et al., 1996;
Dehbonei, et al., 1995).
In order to take profit of the advantages of two
approaches, we propose in this paper an hybrid
method based on a unique representation of the
complete system and which combines simulation
with exhaustive analysis restricted to critical parts.
The underlying formalism is a sub-class of Timed
Automata (Alur and Dill, 1994; Alur et al., 1995),
called TIOSM, Timed Input Output State Machine
(Koné et al., 1995).
This paper will present successively in section 2 the
TIOSM formalism and, in section 3, an overview of
the hybrid validation method. The so-called “partial
model” representing the critical part is defined in
section 4. How to analyze each partial model and to
build an abstraction of it (named a “black box”) is the
purpose of section 5 and section 6. The integration of
these “black boxes” in the complete model and the
simulation process is shown in section 7. Finally we
conclude in section 8.
2. TIMED INPUT OUTPUT STATE MACHINES
In Timed automata (Alur and Dill, 1994) each
transition can be characterized by several clocks
constraints; the form of each constraint is a non-
bounded time interval. In TIOSM formalism, the
form of transition firing time constraints is a bounded
interval.  Moreover, this formalism allows specifying
the application as a set of communicating state-
machines. In a Timed Input Output State Machine,
two main attributes can act on the transition firing:
the reception/emission of messages and, timed
constraints expressed on different clocks.
 Formally, a TIOSM is defined by a tuple
T=(S,L,C,s0,ε) (Koné et al., 1995):
- S is a non empty finite set of states,
- L is a non empty finite set of messages,
- C is a non empty finite set of clocks,
- s0 ∈  S is the initial state of T,
- ε is a non empty finite set of transitions.
Any t ∈  ε has the form t=(s,µ,D,Z,d) where:
- s ∈  S is the origin state of t,
- µ = ({!,?}xLx{τ}; τ is an internal action, !a, ?a
indicates an output or an input of message a, where
a ∈ L,
- D is a non empty, finite list of temporal properties
having the form c∈ [m,M] (c∈ C, m, M∈ Q+),
- Z is a finite set of clocks to be reset after t firing,
- d is the target state of t.
In Fig.1, an example of transition characterization is
illustrated.
!m
h[a ;b]
h’[c ;d]
t
S1
S2
reset(h’’)
Fig. 1. Example of a TIOSM T
Definition: several firing time of a transition t were
defined:
- θ(t,c) is the firing time of t with respect of
constraints on the clock c (where(c,[a;b])∈  D(t))
- θ(t) is the firing time of t with respect of
constraints on each clock c: θ(t) = ∩θ(t,c) /
∀ (c,[a;b]) ∈  D(t)
In order to avoid no-determinism, we add two
hypotheses:
- every transition t=(s,µ,D,Z,d) may only send or
receive a message (there is no internal action:
µ  # τ)
- every pair of transitions (t,t’) with s(t) =s(t’)
respect µ(t) # µ(t’). In the same state, two
transitions can’t use the same message.
The firing transition policy for the transition
characterized in Fig.1 is illustrated in Fig. 2 (in the
document, we note the firing time of t by θ(t)).
x y x+a x+by+c y+d
Value of h’
Value of h
Firing transition
interval
x (resp. y) is the reset time of h (resp. h’)
Fig. 2: Firing interval of t for TIOSM T
Some previous works are based on this formalism. In
particular, the construction of an accessibility graph
similar to the class graph obtained for Timed Petri
Nets (Merlin and Farber, 1976; Berthomieux and
Diaz, 1991) was specified in (Kaiser, 1996). An
extension of the “on the fly” approach, introduced in
(Fernandez et al., 1996), was developed for real-time
properties verification in (Kaiser et al., 2000a);
finally, an adaptive tester, minimizing the number of
inconclusive verdict, was proposed by (Kaiser et al.,
2000b). (Laurençot and Castanet, 1997) proposed a
canonical tester construction used for real systems. A
demonstration of equivalence between TIOSM and
Time Petri nets was demonstrated in (Haar, et al.,
2000).
3. HYBRID VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
As introduced previously, we use for this
methodology both exhaustive analysis for parts of the
system and simulation for the whole system. For this
purpose we must define four kinds of model:
- Complete model is the initial model of the whole
system in terms of TIOSM.
- Partial model is a part of the complete model
assuming to specify a critical part of the behavior
of the whole system (TIOSM formalism)
- A black box is the abstraction of the partial model
obtained after its validation;
- The result of this integration of all the black boxes
in the complete model is called derived model.
The hybrid validation method manipulates these
models along six steps. Two main stages are
necessary. The first one concerns the validation of
critical parts while the second one concerns
validation of the whole system.
Fig.3 illustrates the three first ones whose purpose is
to build and validate the partial models:
- Modeling of the whole system in TIOSM
formalism (complete model)
- Identification of critical part and extraction of
partial models from the complete model; each
result is  a particular TIOSM
- Exhaustive analysis of each partial model; this step
consists in validation of partial model by
application of model checking techniques
The next steps (see Fig.4) require that every partial
model be validated; the role of this step is to build
black boxes and derived model and to validate this
derived model by simulation:
- For each partial model, specification of the
corresponding black box
- Integration of each black box in the complete
model in order to obtain the derived model
- Finally, simulation of the derived model.
Complete Model
Partial model extraction
System Modeling
Partial
Model 1
Partial
Model 2
Partial
Model n
Accessibility
graph
construction
Fail Accessibility
graph 2
Accessibility
graph
construction
Accessibility
graph
construction
Accessibility
graph n
. . .
Fig. 3.  Complete and partial models construction
4. PARTIAL MODEL DEFINITION RULES
The identification of critical part in the whole system
and subsequently, in the complete model is an
activity that needs both a know-how in TIOSM
formalism and a good knowledge of the modeled
system. Nevertheless, we specified a set of rules that
guides the model designer to specify its partial
model. These rules express that the defined partial
models are “independent” of its environment in the
whole system. Then we include temporal information
in the obtained partial models.
4.1. Independence properties
Let TS be the TIOSM modeling the whole system and
TSi (i ∈  [1;n]) be the TIOSMs modeling the partial
models. The “independence” of TSi is expressed by
the following rules (these rules are illustrated on
Fig.5):
Complete Model
Accessibility
graph 1
Accessibility
graph n
. . .
Black boxes construction
Black box 1 Black box n. . .
Integration
Derived Model
Simulation
Fail Pass Verdict
Fig. 4. Black boxes and derived model construction
- Each partial model TSi must have one and only one
“entry” state s (for example, in Fig. 5, S2 is the
“entry” state of partial model TS1 and S3 is the
“entry” state of partial model TS2). It is noted
enter(TSi).
- Each partial model must have at least one “exit”
state. We introduce the set exit(TSi). For example,
in Fig. 5, we have
exit(TS1)={S6}
exit(TS2)= {S6, S7, S8}.
- An “entry” state s or an “exit” state s’ of a partial
model TSi can belong to another partial model TSj
only if:
s ∈  exit(TSj) or s’ ∈  exit(TSj)
- Origin or target of a transition t(s) in the complete
model can be a “entry” state or an “exit” state of a
partial model only if:
s = enter(TSi) or
s ∈  exit(TSi).
S1
S2 S3
S4 S5
S6 S7 S8
S9 S0
S2
S4
S6
S3
S5
S6 S7 S8
Critical
part
Complete
model TS
Partial
model TS1
Partial
model TS2
Fig. 5. Example of partial model definition.
4.2. Temporal attributes of partial models
Some clocks are not used in a partial model (not
reset nor used in any constraint). Nevertheless, for
the complete model simulation, any partial model,
must know the value of these clocks when reaching
their “enter” state. These clocks are added to the set
C of the partial model. This will allow us to build
inequalities systems taking into account their values.
5. ACCESSIBILITY GRAPH
Each TIOSM TSi is exhaustively analyzed. We
developed an algorithm based on the resolution of
inequalities systems thanks to SIMPLEXE method.
An accessibility graph, similar to the state class graph
proposed by (Berthomieu et al., 1991) for Timed
Petri Nets model (Merlin et al., 1976), is computed.
Each node Nk (a state class) of this graph is described
by:
- a state denoted st(Nk) ∈  S(TSi)
- an inequalities system denoted Q(Nk) ; this system
contains information about the firing time of all
transitions that will be fired later.
An edge ek, between an origin and an extremity
nodes (denoted origin(ek) and extremity(ek)),
represents a transition tr(ek) ∈  ε(TSi)  whose firing is
possible from the state st(origine(ek)).
Below, we present the method and illustrate it by an
example (see Fig. 6 for the TIOSMs describing the
whole system, Fig. 7 for the partial model
corresponding to a critical part of this system and
Fig. 8 for the accessibility graph).
5.1. Initial inequalities system
Note, that as TSi is treated independently, the instant
at which, its initial state will be marked is not known.
This instant depends of the trajectory that the whole
system followed before reaching this state. Ninit, the
initial node, is defined by the state s0=enter(TSi) and,
for each clock h∈  C(TSi), by an equation h=h0 (where
h0 is a variable representing the value of h when
reaching s0). In the case studied in Fig.6, 3 clocks are
used in TSi, so the initial system is Qinit={x=x0, y=y0,
z=z0}.
S1
S3 S4
S5 S6
S0
S7 S8
t0
!A
y[0;1] reset(y)
S2
t1 !B
x[2;4]
t3
?D
y[1;4]  
reset(y)   
t4
!E
  z[3;5]
    reset(x)
t5 t6    !A
y[1;2]
    !B
  x[3;4]
reset(z)
t2
?A
x[3;6]
y[1;2]
t8 t9
!E
z[0;10]
!E
z[0;10]
t7
!F
x[5;6]
Fig. 6.  Complete model TS
5.2. Computation of nodes
The construction of the graph is done from the initial
node Ninit:
- st(Ninit)=enter(TSi)
- Q(Ninit)=Qinit
Then for each node Nj, the process is similar: let ei
the edge whose extremity is Nj and consider tr(ei) and
st(Nj) .
S1
S3 S4
S5 S6
S2
t1 !B
x[2;4]
t3
?D
y[1;4]  
reset(y)   
t4
!E
  z[3;5]
    reset(x)
t5 t6
   !A
y[1;2]
   !B
  x[3;4]
reset(z)
t2
?A
x[3;6]
y[1;2]
Fig. 7. Partial model TSi
- In a first step, the different clocks h∈ C(TSi), are
updated.
- If h is reset after tr(ei) firing, then the equation
become h=0.
- If not, the value of h is defined by adding
θ(tr(ei)) to the previous value of h before tr(ei)
firing; this previous value is obtained from the
inequalities system associated to origine(ei).
For example, on Fig. 8, Q(N2) contains the
equation x=x0+θ(t1) where θ(t1) is the firing time of
t1, … and Q(N4) contains the equation x=0,
because clock x is reset while firing t4.
- Then, for each transition tk whose origin is st(Nj),
we consider its clock constraints: for each
constraint expressed on a clock h, h∈ [a,b], the
inequality a-h<θ(tk)<b-h is added at the system.
For example, on Fig.8, the inequalities 3-
x<θ(t2)<6-x, 0-y<θ(t2)<4-y, … are added to
Q(N2)). So, we obtain the inequalities system
characterizing the node.
In order to determine if a transition tk can be fired
from st(Nj), we evaluate if the inequalities system
admits at least one solution. This is done thanks to
SIMPLEXE method. Furthermore, we compute the
minimum and the maximum of tk firing time.
Note that if there is no solution, we conclude that
this transition will never be fired.
If the construction of the accessibility graph shows
that any exit state can be reached, it demonstrates a
“livelock” in the specification. So, the critical part
modeled by TSi is not correct.
If not, this critical part is supposed to be correct (no
deadlock, no “livelock”). Note that this step is
important because the validation of each partial
model is a necessary condition for the validation of
the whole system.
(S1)
x=x0, y=y0,z=z0
2-x<θ(t1)<4-x
(S2)
x=x0+θ(t1),y=y0+θ(t1),
z=z0+θ(t1)
    3-x<θ(t2)<6-x
    0-y<θ(t2)<4-y
    1-y<θ(t3)<4-y
    3-z<θ(t4)<5-z
 (S4)
 x=0
 y=y0+θ(t1) +θ(t4)
 z=z0+θ(t1) +θ(t4)
 3<θ(t6)<4
(S3)
y=0
x=x0+θ(t1)+θ(t3)
z=z0+θ(t1)+θ(t3)
1<θ(t5)<2
(S6)
x=x0+θ(t1)+θ(t3)
       +θ(t5)
y=θ(t5)
z=z0+θ(t1)+θ(t3)
       +θ(t5)
(S6)
x=θ(t6)
y=y0+θ(t1)+θ(t4)
       +θ(t6)
z=0
(S5)
x=x0+θ(t1)+θ(t2)
y=y0+θ(t1)+θ(t2)
z=z0+θ(t1)+θ(t2)
N3
N2
N4
N6 N7N5
N1
t1
t3
t2
t5
t4
t6
Fig. 8. Accessibility graph of partial model TSi
6. BLACK BOXES CONSTRUCTION
This construction is illustrated in Fig. 9 that
represents the black box for the partial model of Fig.
7. It is done only when every partial model of TS is
validated. If one at least is not validated, we conclude
that the system modeled by TS is not correct.
From each validated partial model, an abstraction of
TSi is done. It reflects temporal properties of TSi. In
fact, this abstraction, called black box specifies how
the time can be passed from the arrival of the
complete system at the enter(TSi) to its arrival to a
state belonging to exit(TSi).
This black box has one and only one initial state
Sinit=st(Ninit) (S1, in the presented example) and one
terminal state Sk for each terminal node Nk
characterized by (st(Nk),Q(Nk)). In the same example,
nodes N5, N6,1, N6,2 give 3 terminal states S5, S6,1, S6,2.
Notice that in this example two nodes refer the same
state S6 in TSi; so, we create two different states in the
black box.
An inequalities system, Q’k, is created and associated
to each “black box” terminal state Sk that corresponds
to a terminal node Nk;
Q’k contains:
- Q(Nk)
- Qinit,k: all the inequalities that are associated to the
transitions labeling edges on the path {Ninit , Nk}
found in the accessibility graph.
For example, in Fig. 9, Q’5 is defined by  {Q(N5),
Q1,5}.
S1
S5 S6,1 S6,2
Q’5
Q(N5)
 x=x0+θ(t1)+θ(t2)
 y=y0+θ(t1)+θ(t2)
 z=z0+θ(t1)+θ(t2)    
Q1,5
2-x0 < θ(t1) < 4- x0
3-x0-θ(t1) < θ(t2)
θ(t2) < 6-x0-θ(t1)
0-y0-θ(t1) < θ(t2)
θ(t2) < 4-y0-θ(t1)
Q’6,2
Q(N6,2)
 x=θ(t6)
 y=y0+θ(t1)+θ(t4)+θ(t6)
 z=0    
Q1,6,2
2-x0 < θ(t1) < 4- x0
3-z0-θ(t1) < θ(t4)
θ(t4) < 5-z0-θ(t1)
3 < θ(t6)<4
Q’6,1
Q(N6,1)
 x=x0+θ(t1)+θ(t3)+θ(t5)
 y=θ(t5)
 z=z0+θ(t1)+θ(t3)+θ(t5)
   
Q1,6,1
2-x0 < θ(t1) < 4- x0
1-y0-θ(t1) < θ(t3)
θ(t3) < 4-y0-θ(t1)
1 < θ(t5) < 2
Fig. 9. Black box of partial model TSi
7. DERIVED MODEL
7.1. Generation of derived model
The derived model that corresponds to the example
(Fig. 6) is presented in Fig. 10.
The integration in a complete model of a “black box”
corresponding to TSi follows several steps:
- suppression in the complete model of each state
and transition belonging to TSi
- adding the “black box” to the obtained model
* each transition t leading, in the complete model to
enter(TSi), is linked to Sinit. For example, in Fig. 10,
t0 and t7 are connected to S1
* each transition t, whose origin state s belongs to
exit(TSi),  are linked to each black box terminal
state associated to s. In Fig. 6, t9 is connected both
to S6,1 and to S6,2, while t8 is connected only to S5.
S1
S5 S6,1
!F
x[5 ;6]
t0?Ay[0;1]
reset(y)
S0
S6,2
S7
S8
t8 !E
z[0;10]
t9
!E
z[0;10]
t9
!E
z[0;10]
!F
x[5 ;6]
t7
t7
Fig. 10. The derived model of example (Fig.6)
7.2. Derived model simulation
Along the simulation process, we verify that, when
reaching an initial state of a “black box”, the value of
the different clocks allows an exit of the “black box”.
The simulation algorithm progress from state to state
and the calculus of transition firing time is based on
the following rules:
- At initialization, all the clocks used in the complete
model are reset,
- Let S be the current state at a simulation step; the
objective of the simulation is then to determine if
there is at least a reachable state and, if yes, at
which time this state can be reached. Two cases
can be identified:
- S is not an entry state of any partial model; a
transition t, from those that can be fired is chosen
according to a given strategy (depth first, random
choice, …) and an instant for this transition
firing is determined (minimum, maximum, mean,
random value); every clocks h∈ C(TS) are then
updated or reset if they belong to Z(t).
- S is an entry state for a partial model; every
clock variable representing partial model entry
time must be updated (in example illustrated by
Fig. 5 and 6, these variables are x0, y0 and z0).
Thanks to the SIMPLEXE method applied to the
inequalities systems associated to the black box,
it is possible to find which exit states are
reachable and when they can be reached.
Similarly to the precedent case, the simulation
algorithm choose a reachable exit states and its
reaching time among the possibilities given by
SIMPLEXE method.
This mechanism stops in two cases.
- When, from a current state, any transition can be
fired or any partial model exit state can be reached;
if the system is not blocked in one of its terminal
state, we identify a livelock and we prove that the
modeled system is not correct.
- When the simulation duration is reached; in this
case we conclude that the system is correct
according to the simulation scenario.
Two simulations of system presented Fig. 5 are
illustrated in Fig. 11 and Fig.12.
In the first case, for the tried scenario, there is no
problem; the system reaches S7 that is one of its
terminal state. Note that, as we simulate the system,
it is said to be correct according to this particular
scenario.
In the second case, the system is blocked in S1. So we
conclude that the system is not correct.
S0
S5
S7
S1
t0
Clock values :
x=0 ; y=0 ; z=0
Clock values :
x=1 ; y=0 ; z=1
Choice of firing time of t0:
x=1
SIMPLEXE
The time necessary to cross the
black box  is in [2 ;4]
Clock values :
x=4 ; y=3 ; z=4
t8
Clock values :
x=9 ; y=8 ; z=9
Choice of firing time of t8:
z=9
Fig. 11. Complete system is correct for this scenario
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE TRENDS
The hybrid method presented in this document shows
how to combine simulation and exhaustive analysis.
A unique formalism that is specialization of Timed
Automata supports both the activities. The exhaustive
analysis is done by model checking and concerns
only the critical parts of a large system. So it limits
the dimension of the accessibility graph. The results
obtained on these partial models are inserted in the
global model that can be then simulated.
S0
S6,1
S1
S1
t0
Clock values :
x=0 ; y=0 ; z=0
Clock values :
x=1 ; y=0 ; z=1
Clock values :
x=4 ; y=2 ; z=4
t7
Clock values :
x=5 ; y=3 ; z=5
There is no solution !
LIVELOCK
Choice of firing time of t0:
x=1
Choice of firing time of t7:
x=5
SIMPLEXE
The time necessary to cross the
black box  is in [2 ;6]
Fig. 12. Complete system is not correct
This method is implemented in a tool prototype
Xtiosm (Santos Marques R., 2001). We are studying
how to generalize the presented concepts in order to
develop a library of re-usable model of partial system
that are exhaustively “pre-analyzed”. This will allow
the design of a whole model by “connecting” or
“composing” several partial models modeled as
“black boxes”.
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